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The University and the Bail System:
in Loco Altricis**
Harry W. Pettigrew*
T HE CENTRAL ARGUMENT OF THIS ARTICLE is that where a transient
college student is arrested financial bail is seldom necessary to
assure the defendant's presence in court. However, in such a case
financial bail is almost always required by the court, since in the area
of bail, as with other criminal law problems, the pragmatic exigencies
of the traditional American criminal law system place a heavy burden
on any transient to realize the same protections, privileges, and rights
provided the indigenous population.'
The principal objective of this article is to describe an alternative
to the financial bail system for the arrested transient college student.
University students make up a large and growing class of transients, 2
who, in recent years, have been highly visible victims of the financial
bail system. This class of transient college students has been created
by a substantial number of college students emigrating from their par-
ents' place of residence to a somewhat distant university community
for approximately nine months of the year, in which time the students
normally have negligible ties with their new community except for
those with the university.
The modern university can and should provide the necessary as-
sistance to this student between his arrest and trial by substituting a
theory of in loco altricis for the superannuated and passing concept of
in loco parentis.3 That is, the student-university relationship should be
** In Loco Altricis is a Latin phrase which describes a relationship between the stu-
dent and the university, whereby an important function of the university is to offer
those services to the transient student which the student has lost due to the sever-
ance of his hometown community ties.
* Of Athens, Ohio. Assistant Professor of Business Law, Ohio University; member
of the Ohio Bar.
1 Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 959, 1129-30
(1965) [hereinafter cited as Foote].
2 More than seven million students were enrolled in nearly 2,600 colleges and univer-
sities in the United States in 1969. REPORT OF THE AMERICAN BAa ASSOCIATION COM-
MISSION ON CAMPUS GOVERNMENT AND STUDENT DISSENT, 5 (1969).
3 The in loco parentis doctrine is an extension of the concept of the state as patens
patriae-the state succeeding to the duties of the parent whenever the latter is un-
able to attend to them. Wisconsin Indus. School for Girls v. Clark County, 103 Wis.
651, 668-69, 79 N.W. 422, 428 (1899). The in loco parentis doctrine is well illustrated
in Gott v. Berea College, 156 Ky. 376, 379; 161 S.W. 204, 206 (1913) by the following
quotation:
College authorities stand in loco parentis concerning the physical and moral wel-
fare and mental training of the pupils, and we are unable to see why, to that end,
they may not make any rule or regulation for the government or betterment of
their pupils that a parent could for the same purpose. Whether the rules or regu-
lations are wise, or their aims worthy is a matter left solely to the discretion of
the authorities or parents, as the case may be....
In Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114 (1859) over a century ago the court exposed the
more obvious difficulties of in loco parentis:
[P]arental power is little liable to abuse, for it is continually restrained by nat-
ural affection, the tenderness which the parent feels for his offspring, an affection
ever on the alert, and acting rather by instinct than reasoning.
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such that an important function of the university is to offer those serv-
ices to the transient student which the student has lost due to the
severance of his "home-town" community ties,4 rather than to exer-
cise surrogate authority for the parent in regulating the student's be-
havior.5
The Hypothetical Student-Accused
Mr. S, a twenty-year old transient student, is arrested in a drug
raid in the middle of the winter quarter. At the time of the arrest Mr.
S was in his dormitory room with Mr. R, his roommate, who had on
his person ten grains of codeine. Mr. S has never had any illegal drug
in his physical possession. Messrs. S and R are charged under state
felony statutes for having a narcotic drug under their control and/or
their possession.6
Bail is set at $2,500 each. Mr. S is a junior with a "C" average. He
works summers and vacations to defray college expenses and re-
cently has been working part-time during the academic year to meet
the rising college costs. The socio-economic level of the parents of Mr.
S is middle-middle class. They have a daughter who is a freshman in
college and two high-school age children. All of their assets are mort-
gaged. The grand jury does not meet for four months.7 The family is
told that the bondsman will require a premium of $250 plus collateral
and that the expense of competent defense counsel will probably ex-
ceed $500. If the student somehow manages to secure bond, must he
drop out of college to earn the necessary money for his defense or will
(Continued from preceding page)
The schoolmaster [university] has no such natural restraint. Hence he [it] may
not safely be trusted with all a parent's authority, for he [it] does not act from
the instinct of parental affection. (The concept of the university is added.) Id.
122-123.
In addition, the mean age of the American college student is over 21 years and
there are fewer students under the age of 18 than over the age of 30. U. S. BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, DEPT. OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, Series P-20, No. 110,
Population Characteristics 12 (1961). Even in Blackstone's time, the doctrine did not
apply to persons over 21. Van Alstyne, Student Activism, The Laws and the Courts,
in PROTEST! STUDENT ACTIVISM IN AMERICA 537 (Foster and Long eds. 1970) [herein-
after cited as PROTEST].
4 This concept may be somewhat analogous to the concept of the university in a fidu-
ciary capacity. Seavey, Dismissal of Students: "Due Process," 70 HARv. L. REV. 1406
(1957). However, unlike the in loco altricis doctrine, the logic of the fiduciary con-
cept may be limited to on campus student activities.
5 Cazier, Student Power and In Loco Parentis, in PROTEST 509. On the college campus
there is a tendency to reject the theory of in loco parentis entirely and three juris-
dictions have recently done so. Moore v. Student Affairs Comm. of Troy State Univ.,
284 F. Supp. 725, 729 (M.D. Ala. 1968); Buttny v. Smiley, 281 F. Supp. 280 (D. Colo.
1968); Goldberg v. Regents of the Univ. of California, 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 57 Cal.
Rptr. 463 (1967).
6 OHIO REV. CODE § 3719.09(B) (2) and (C) (September 16, 1970) provides that the
possession of more than four grains of codeine is presumptive evidence of the intent
to violate the statute. OHIo REv. CODE § 3719.99(c) (1969) provides that a violation of
§ 3719.09 is punishable as a felony.
7 In most states the grand jury meets according to court rule. Therefore, in counties
with small populations ("college towns") the regular sessions of the grand jury may
only be every six months.
8 "[The] preliminary hearing is a 'critical stage' of the State's criminal process at
which the accused is 'as much entitled to . . .aid [of court-appointed counsel] as at
the trial itself.'" Coleman v. State of Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
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he qualify for court-appointed counsels as an indigent? 9 Of course,
he may have already been suspended from his university merely be-
cause of the arrest.'0 Does it matter that four months later the grand
jury does not indict Mr. S, or has the archaic system of bail already
punished him?
The bail bond system, which postulates a monetary payment as a
prerequisite to pretrial freedom," must, of necessity, allow the af-
9 Trial judges have a tendency to determine the indigent or non-indigent status of
a college student in accordance with the ability of the parents to provide financial
assistance. However, it is contended that "[c]ounsel should be provided to any per-
son who is financially unable to obtain adequate representation without substantial
hardship to himself or his family. Counsel should not be denied to any person mere-
ly because his friends or relatives have resources adequate to retain counsel or be-
cause he has posted or is capable of posting bond." AmERICAN BAa ASSOCIATION
PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO PRO-
VIDING DEF NSE SERVICES, 10 Approved Draft (1968).
10 This is the disciplinary practice at many universities. Contra, The REPORT OF THE
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION CommiSssIoN ON CAiPUS GoVEmNMENr AND STUDENT DISSENT,
24-25 (1969), j. Interim Suspension, provided: "As a general rule the status of a stu-
dent should not be altered until the charges brought against him have been adjudi-
cated. Experience has shown, however, that prompt and decisive disciplinary action
may be required in extreme cases before there is an opportunity to conduct a hear-
ing, as in cases in which a student's continued presence on campus constitutes an
immediate threat or injury to the well-being or property of members of the univer-
sity community, or to the property or the orderly functioning of the university.
MODEL CODE FOR STUDENT RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES AND CONDUCT, STUDENT LAW Divi-
SION OF THE AMERICAN BAR AssocIATION 6 (1969) stated that in extraordinary circum-
stances the student may be suspended pending consideration of the case. The Joint
Statement on Rights and Freedoms of Students, 54 A.A.U.P. BULL. 258, 261 (June,
1968) provided that, pending action on the charges, the status of a student should
not be altered, or his right to be present on campus and attend classes suspended,
except for reasons relating to the safety and well-being of students, faculty, or uni-
versity property. Academic Freedom and Civil Liberties of Students in Colleges and
Universities, American Civil Liberties Union (April, 1970), 19 n. 1, provided that,
"[a] student may be suspended only in exceptional circumstances involving danger
to health, safety or disruption of the educational process."
11 The commercial bondsman was a welcomed innovation in early America because
of the many newcomers who were without personal friends or relatives to aid them
in securing bail. Note, Bail or Jail: Toward an Alternative, 21 U. FLA. L. REV. 59, 61
(1968) [hereinafter cited as Bail or Jail: Toward an Alternative]. Today, as then,
the government has a legitimate interest in requiring some assurance that the re-
leased defendant will appear for trial so that the orderly processes of criminal justice
are not subverted. Ralls, Bail in the United States, 48 MICH. STATE BAR J. 28, 31
(Jan., 1969) [hereinafter cited as Ralls]. However, does bail in the form of commer-
cial bonding bear a rational relationship to this state interest?
The amount at which bail is set by the court does not indicate the financial stake
of the accused who is released on a bondsman's suretyship. The stake of the accused
may be limited to the typical premium of between five and ten per cent of the face
amount of the bond which is paid to the bondsman. Ralls, 31. Upon payment of such
premium, it is forever lost even though the accused appears at the appointed time.
If the accused absconds, the bondsman must forfeit the entire face amount of the
bonds at least in theory. The bondsman, even though infrequently exercising his
common-law ability to pursue and arrest the bail jumper, has oftentimes avoided
forfeiture (Paulsen, Pre-trial Release in the United States, 66 COLUa. L. REV. 109, 115
[1966] [hereinafter cited as Paulsen]), since the state or federal law enforcement
agencies, with their developing police science technology, frequently recapture the
bail jumper at the taxpayer's expense before a forfeiture is ordered. Bail or Jail:
Toward an Alternative, 70.
Since the accused can expect no refund of the bondsman's premium should he
return for trial at the proper time, what is the factor that encourages him to return
at all? Of course, the bondsman may require collateral in addition to a premium,
but the court does not know whether a higher bond for a particular applicant means
that he has a greater stake. Ralls, 31. Since the bondsman is responsible to no one
and is subject to no review, he can refuse to write a bail bond whenever he chooses
without a valid or sensible reason. Criminal Law Edition, 2 Ohio State Bar Associa-
tion Letter 1, 2 (Jan., 1965) [hereinafter cited as Ohio State Bar Service Letter].
(Continued on next page)
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fluent to glean from the system certain advantages which are not ac-
cessible to the economically disadvantaged. 1 2 The result of such dis-
similarity of pre-trial treatment is the creation of burdens to the public,13
to the accused,14 and to the integrity of the judicial system, 5 which in
turn provide impetus to the evolving constitutional doctrines 16 which
eschew the results of such economic disparity.
(Continued from preceding page)
In such instances the bondsmen "hold the keys to the jail in [their] pockets.... The
court . . . [is] relegated to the relatively unimportant chore of fixing the amount of
bail." Pannell v. United States, 320 F. 2d 698, 699 (D.C. Cir. 1963) (Wright, J., con-
curring).
12 However, these advantages must be minimized where their existence is based on
a bondsman system which is not a demonstrably rational and effective approach to
its ostensible reason for existence-assuring the accused's presence at trial. Larkin,
Legal Services for the Poor-A Bail Project for Boston, 49 M.ss. L. Q. 307, 309 (1964).
1 The burdens to the public may include (A) the detention expense, (B) the family
of the accused successfully applying for relief, (C) the deprivation of funds to hire
counsel, therefore, the state will often have to appoint counsel and provide a free
transcript on appeal, (D) the loss of revenue from the earning power of the accused,
and (E) the drainage of the police force of manpower to maintain cells for detention
until trial.
14 The burdens to the accused may include (A) the loss of employment, (B) the
subjection of the accused to the influence of the persons already convicted of crimes
and serving their jail sentences, (C) the disruption of family ties, and (D) the ex-
haustion of assets, and the inability to get welfare while in pretrial detention.
15 The burdens to the accused and to the integrity of the judicial system may in-
clude (A) the impairment of the defense for the accused, because i) an accused is
more effective in locating and persuading witnesses to testify than his attorney and
is sometimes necessary for the finding of exculpatory evidence, ii) counsel cannot
easily communicate with his client, iii) the accused is exposed to bad jailhouse ad-
vice by the police and prisoners, iv) an accused is unable to work. and thereby
choose his own counsel, and v) the accused is tempted into a hasty guilty plea or
to insist upon an immediate trial in spite of the disadvantages flowing from hurried
work by the defense counsel; (B) the guilty appearance that attaches to the ac-
cused's entry into the courtroom before the jury under a police escort, and; (C) the
severance of important family ties and regular employment which may suggest to
a court that this accused's prospects for rehabilitation through probation have been
lessened. The statistical correlation between 1) pretrial detention and 2) conviction
and prison sentence, which certain bail studies have noted, suggests that 1) detention
and 2) conviction and prison sentence are causally related. Ralls, 32.
16 The Due Process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment provides a multi-pronged
argument to the effect that the contemporary financial bail practice often denies the
accused: 1) fundamental fairness because although he alleges he is innocent, he is
being punished by incarceration before being convicted, 2) procedural due process
because pretrial detention adversely affects the disposition of his case and thereby
deprives him of a fair trial, 3) effective assistance of counsel because the defendant
cannot aid in his own case preparation, and 4) the ability to make bail because the
amount is excessive. See Foote, 1135. As to the fourth prong (the due process-
excessive bail argument) in United States v. Lawrence, 26 Fed. Cas. 887, 888 (No.
15577 (C.C.D.C. 1835) the Circuit Court implied in dictum that the Constitution for-
bade excessive bail and that to require bail greater than the accused could make
would be to require excessive bail. However, few courts have followed the Law-
rence dictum. More recently in Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 6 (1951) the Court implied
in dictum that bail set in the average amount is reasonable and that individualization
is required only for amounts greater than the average.
In addition, the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the
basis for the argument that no man should be denied release because of indigence;
that is, a man is entitled to release on personal recognizance unless the government
overcomes heavy presumptions favoring freedom. This argument was presented in
dictum in Bandy v. United States, 81 S. Ct. 197, 197-8 (1960). The Bandy case is the
best indication to date that the equal protection philosophy of Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12, 18 (1956)-which held that the denial to indigents of a free transcript on
appeal was a denial of equal protection-might apply in the field of bail. Contra,
Reeves v. State of Alaska, 411 P. 2d 212, 216 (Alaska 1966).
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol20/iss3/9
Proposal for ROR for Transient College Students
Objective
At present, the judiciaries of most college towns and urban centers
with transient student populations have neither the manpower nor
ready access to information on the majority of accused parties in order
to rationally predict whether an accused will appear for trial, should
a financial bond not be required.I7
The objective of this proposal is to ameliorate the economic and
constitutional problems inherent in financial bail by assuring the courts
that verified information as to the relevant factors of an accused's
proclivities to appear at trial will be provided as a predicate for a more
widespread release of the accused on his own word that he will return
for all proceedings up to and including trial, that is, on his own recog-
nizance' s (hereafter referred to as ROR).
17 The judge, at arraignment, knows the current charge and probably the accused's
past record, if any. Ordinarily, there is no factual input to the judge concerning the
character or financial condition of the defendant. On occasion an attempt is made to
elicit such facts, but usually no inquiry is made. Whatever information may be
present, even by the accused's attorney, is usually unverified. Moreover, the process
may be even less personalized, since in many localities bail is set in reference to a
pre-arranged schedule keyed solely to the charge involved. Paulsen, 113. The result
is that bail is often set higher than is reasonably necessary to assure the appearance
of the accused at trial. Ares, et al., The Manhattan Bail Project, 38 N.Y.U. L. REv.
67, 71 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Ares, et al.].
Is The ROR doctrine has developed substantially from the 1936 case of McNair's
Petition, 324 Pa. 48, 187 A. 498, wherein the magistrate's requiring no bail was held
to constitute, without more, no offense or violation of his duties of office, although
the practice was not recommended or encouraged.
The Manhattan Bail Project, the precursor of many successful projects, reported
that during its first thirty months 2,300 of the accused who were evaluated to be
good risks were released OR. Only one per cent failed to appear. The factors which
have been utilized to determine whether the accused has sufficient community ties to
be a good risk are as follows: 1) residence, 2) employment, 3) relatives in the area,
and 4) any previous convictions. During the same period, about three per cent of
a comparison group freed on financial bail failed to appear in court. Thus the project
staff concluded that verified information about an accused's background is a more
reliable criterion on which to release an accused than is his ability to purchase a bail
bond. Ohio State Bar Service Letter, 2.
These projects have relieved the accused and society of the many burdens im-
posed when financial bail is the sole form of release. In addition, they have accom-
modated the constitutional arguments which militate against financial bail.
In the federal system Rule 46, FEDE1AL RuLEs OF CRerMINAL PROCEDUR, and the
BAIL REFO m ACT of 1966 (18 U.S.C. §§ 3041, 3141, 3141-3143, 3146-3152, 3568) now
provide that under certain circumstances the accused may be released on his per-
sonal recognizance or upon the execution of an unsecured appearance bond.
Several states have provided for release on one's own recognizance. Representa-
tive of these laws is the Osio RaV. CODE § 2937.29 (1965):
Release on own recognizance.
When from all the circumstances the court is of the opinion that the accused will
appear as required, either before or after conviction, the accused may be re-
leased on his own recognizance. A failure to appear as required by such recog-
nizance shall constitute an offense subject to the penalty provided in section
2937.99 of the Revised Code. (emphasis added.)
Under the Osro REv. CODE § 2937.99 (1965) the penalty for non-appearance is a
misdemeanor where the release was on a charge of a misdemeanor and a felony
where the charge was a felony.
In order to determine whether the statute is mandatory or permissive the term
"may" must be construed. In statutory use the word "may" is generally construed
to make the provision in which it is contained discretionary (Dennison v. Dennison,
165 Ohio St. 146, 134 N.E. 2d 574 [1956]), at least where there is nothing in the sense
of the entire statute which requires a mandatory construction. State ex ret. John
(Continued on next page)
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Such an effort could eventually cover all defendants within the
jurisdictions. However, because of the possibilities of lack of initial
manpower the project may be limited to the impecunious student and
non-student defendant. Such an indigent would be defined as any party
who by his own resources does not have the ability to make financial
bail. In addition, initially the project may be limited to felonies or even
only certain types of felonies.1 9
Both the local bar association, 20 legal aid service, or other similar
(Continued from preceding page)
Tague Post v. Klinger, 114 Ohio St. 212, 151 N.E. 47 (1926).
The term "may" has been declared to be mandatory where the due administra-
tion of justice requires it (Fugitt v. Lake Erie & W. R. Co., 287 F. 556 [1923]), or in
order to give effect to the clear policy and intention of the legislature (State ex rel.
John Tague Post v. Klinger, 114 Ohio St. 212, 151 N.E. 47 [N.D. Ohio 1926]), that is,
where the legislature means to impose a positive and absolute duty. Cincinnati v.
Roettinger, 105 Ohio St. 145, 137 N.E. 6 (1922).
The obvious purpose of this statute was to encourage the use of ROR by pro-
viding statutory sanction, since at the time of its enactment the Ohio legislature was
aware of a successful experience in Toledo's experimental ROR project. Criminal
Law Edition, 3 Ohio State Bar Association Service Letter 1, 3 (1965).
The use of the term "opinion" in the statute, in reference to the court's opinion,
further indicates the intention of the legislature to make the operation of the statute
discretionary.
Even though the effectuation of the statute may be discretionary (Harrington,
Attorneys Conducting Criminal Defense Have New Duties to Client, 38 OHIO BAR
1309, 1310 [1965] [hereinafter cited as Harrington]), this does not ordinarily allow
for wilful or arbitrary action by the court, rather the court is regulated by estab-
lished rules of law. Fessenden v. Fessenden, 32 Ohio App. 16, 165 N.E. 746 (1928).
The established principles of law, in relation to release on one's own recognizance,
would arguably be analogous to the statutory requirements for financial bail. OHIO
REV. CoDE § 2937.23 (1961), states that, "[i]n all cases [bail] shall be fixed with con-
sideration of the seriousness of the offense charged, the previous criminal record of
the defendant, and the probability of his appearing at the trial of the case."
However, in order to successfully gain reversal on appeal for abuse of discretion
it must be shown that the attitude of the trial court was unreasonable, arbitrary or
unconscionable. Lee v. Jennings Transfer Co., 14 Ohio App. 2d 221, 237 N.E. 2d 918
(1967).
The argument that the due administration of justice requires the statutory lan-
guage to be construed as mandatory becomes cogent when based on the constitu-
tional arguments of denial of due process and denial of the equal protection of the
laws (see n. 16 supra) in conjunction with a viable bail project which will effectively
provide the judge with verified information as to "all of the circumstances" of the
accused's probabilities of appearing as required. Cf. Even if the statute would be
construed as mandatory, verified information may be essential to ROR as indicated
by Reeves v. State of Alaska, 411 P. 2d 212 (Alaska 1966), where the attorney for the
indigent defendant, at 216, refused to submit facts for the trial judge to consider in
determining whether the defendant should be released OR, but chose to assert, at
213 n. 4, the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment (as well as an
Alaska statute and the Alaska Constitution) as entitling him to be released OR. The
court, at 214, held that an indigent defendant does not have an absolute right to pre-
trial ROR. In addition, in Koen v. Long, 302 F. Supp. 1383 (E.D. Mo. 1969) the court,
at 1391, stated: "No court has yet held that the Eighth Amendment or any other
affords a basis for claiming a constitutional right to be released in any given situation
without bail or on one's own recognizance."
19 Although the Manhattan Bail Project initially excluded certain categories of bail-
able offenses, soon they included all bailable offenses. Workshop: Establishing Bail
Projects, 1965 U. ILL. L. F. 42, 48 (1965).
20 "Each jurisdiction should adopt procedures designed to increase the number of
defendants released on an order to appear or on their own recognizance. Additional
conditions should be imposed on release only where the need is demonstrated by the
facts of the individual case. Methods for providing the appropriate judicial officer
with a reliable statement of the facts relevant to the release decision should be de-
veloped." AaERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL RELEASE 25 Approved Draft (1968) [herein-
after cited as STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL RELEASE].
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organization, and the university, 21 should have the requisite commit-
ments to the total community to provide resources and guidance for the
success of such a project.
Methodology of Implementation
Each locale must develop its own program molded by many variables.
A paradigm22 is as follows:
(1) Members of the local bar association or legal aid service, mem-
bers of the general community, or university students may act as staff
members. The university should provide the interviewers with training
in the behavioral science aspects of interviewing and other interpersonal
relationship training. The possibilities for the source of student staff
interviewers should include law students2' and graduate students in
such areas as psychology, sociology, and guidance and counseling, where
the student would have developed a professional attitude toward such
interviewing.
(2) The staff member assigned to that shift will contact the county
and/or municipal jails. The desk officer will inform the project worker
of any newly incarcerated defendants.
(3) Upon learning that an accused is incarcerated the staff member
will proceed to the jail and record the defendant's previous criminal
record and the current charge (s) against him. 24
21 The easiest purpose to recognize for the existence of the university is the trans-
mission of knowledge. However, within this broad umbrella there is a "profound con-
flict between the view that the university exists to serve the present constitution of
society and assure its maintenance and the view that the campus provides its most
important contribution as a place of innovation and experiment." Monypenny, Uni-
versity Purpose, Discipline and Due Process, 43 N. D. L. REv. 739, 739-40 (1967).
Under either view, the university's participation in the ROR program should fit with-
in its purpose.
22 The community of Athens, Ohio, with a non-student population of approximately
13,000 and an Ohio University student population of 18,000 is presently implementing
a variation of the below mentioned program. Suggested procedural forms are avail-
able by writing to the author, Department of Business Law, Copeland Hall, Ohio
University, Athens, Ohio 45701.
23 As in several other states, the Ohio Supreme Court has, by its Rules of Practice,
made provisions whereby third year law students may be certified to act as legal
interns and thereby may represent, under supervision, an indigent. Rules of Practice
of the Supreme Court of Ohio, Rule XVII A., 20 Ohio St. 2d xvii, xxxv (1970). Un-
der this rule, legal interns have ready access to interviews with indigent clients.
24 Where the turn-key of the jail is uncooperative with a non-lawyer Data Verifier,
"defense counsel may find it a part of his duty to assist his client in providing the
interviewer with the information needed to make the determination as to whether or
not release without bond is justified." "Protection of his client's financial interest,
as well as the overriding interest in the client's personal freedom, will motivate the
defending counsel." Harrington, 1310. This "duty" is reasonably easy to effect since
the defense counsel's client has both a constitutional and statutory right to consult
with his counsel.
In the case of Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), the Court at 339, stated:
"The Sixth Amendment provides, 'In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall en-
joy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.'" The Court at
342, further stated: "We accept Betts v. Brady's assumption, based as it was on our
prior cases, that a provision of the Bill of Rights which is 'fundamental and essential
to a fair trial' is made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment. We
think the Court in Betts was wrong, however, in concluding that the Sixth Amend-
ment's guarantee of counsel is not one of these fundamental rights."
In Powell v. State of Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), the Court stated: "[D]uring
perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings against these defendants, that is
to say, from the time of their arraignment until the beginning of their trial, when
consultation, thoroughgoing investigation and preparation were vitally important,
(Continued on next page)
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(4) If the record indicates that he is eligible for bail and the ac-
cused indicates that he would like to receive ROR, he will be interviewed
by the staff member to determine whether he is a good risk, in that he
has ties to the community and, therefore, will return for trial.25 The
interview will take about fifteen minutes.
(Continued from preceding page)
the defendants did not have the aid of counsel in any real sense, although they
were as much entitled to such aid during that period as at the trial itself." Further,
in Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 325 (1959) (Douglas, J., Black, J., and Brennan,
J., concurring), added: "Depriving a person, formally charged with a crime, of coun-
sel during the period prior to trial may be more damaging than denial of counsel
during the trial itself."
In addition, there exists a statutory right in most states for a client's consultation
with his attorney prior to trial. The Ohio Revised Code provides several sections in
point:
§ 2935.14 (1960) Rights of person arrested.
If the person arrested is unable to offer sufficient bail or, if the offense charged
be a felony, he shall, prior to being confined or removed from the county of
arrest, as the case may be, be speedily permitted facilities to communicate
with an attorney at law of his own choice, or to communicate with at least one
relative or other person for the purpose of obtaining counsel (or in cases of mis-
demeanors or ordinance violation for the purpose of arranging bail). He shall
not thereafter be confined or removed from the county or from the situs of ini-
tial detention until such attorney has had reasonable opportunity to confer with
him privately, or other person to arrange bail, under such security measures as
may be necessary under the circumstances.
Whoever, being a police officer in charge of a prisoner, or the custodian of anyjail or place of confinement, violates this section shall be fined not less than one
hundred nor more than five hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than thirty
days, or both. (emphasis added.)
§ 2935.20 (1965) Right to counsel.
After the arrest, detention, or any other taking into custody of a person, with
or without a warrant, such person shall be permitted forthwith facilities to com-
municate with an attorney at law of his own choice who is entitled to practice
in the courts of this state, or to communicate with any other person of his own
choice for the purpose of obtaining counsel. Such communication may be made
by a reasonable number of telephone calls or in any other reasonable manner.
Such person shall have a right to be visited immediately by any attorney at law
so obtained who is entitled to practice in the courts of this state, and to consult
with him privately. No officer or any other agent of this state shall prevent,
attempt to prevent, or advise such person against the communication, visit, or
consultation provided for by this section.
Whoever violates this section shall be fined not less than twenty-five nor more
than one hundred dollars or imprisoned not more than thirty days, or both.
(emphasis added.)
§ 2937.03 (1961) Arraignment; counsel; bail.
After the announcement, as provided by § 2937.02 of the Revised Code the ac-
cused shall be arraigned by the magistrate, or clerk, or prosecutor of the court
reading the affidavit or complaint, or reading its substance, omitting purely for-
mal parts, to him unless such reading be waived. The judge or magistrate shall
then inquire of the accused whether he understands the nature of the charge.
If he does not indicate understanding, the magistrate shall give explanation in
terms of the statute or ordinance claimed violated. If he is not represented by
counsel and expresses desire to consult with an attorney at law, the judge or
magistrate shall continue the case for a reasonable time to allow him to send for
or consult with counsel and shall set bail for such later appearance if the offense
is bailable. If the accused is not able to make bail, or the offense is not bailable,
the court or magistrate shall require the officer having custody of accused forth-
with to take a message to any attorney at law within the municipal corporation
where accused is detained, or to make available to accused forthwith use of tele-
phone for calling to arrange for legal counsel or bail. (emphasis added.)
25 Despite the attempt by the interviewer to avoid the subject, defendants some-
times allude to the question of guilt. The relationship between the interviewer and
the prosecution therefore needs to be clarified in order to assure the defendant that
the information he gives will not be used against him at trial. The same problem
(Continued on next page)
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(5) A point system helps evaluate the answers to the questionnaire,
and if the accused appears to be a good risk the above information is
verified, where possible, by telephone.
(6) For verification the staff members will only speak to those
persons who the accused has agreed in writing should be consulted.
The verification process will take about one hour.
(7) If the case is still considered a good risk after verification, a
summary of the information is taken to the court, where a recommenda-
tion that the defendant be released on his own recognizance is sub-
mitted to the judge. (Where a non-lawyer executes the verification
process, perhaps a designated attorney should review the recommenda-
tion before it is forwarded to the judge.) The recommendation is not a
public record.26
(8) The court is, of course, free to accept or reject the recom-
mendation for release OR. 27
(9) After a defendant is released OR, project staff members will
notify him in writing of the date and location of subsequent court ap-
pearances. Often a friend or employer will agree to help get the defend-
ant to court. If so, this person will be notified as well.
Academic Commitment as Community Tie
The traditional factors used in other bail projects for determina-
tion of community ties are 1) residence, 2) employment, 3) relatives in
the area, and 4) any previous convictions. Such limited criteria, in
general, will not make a transient college student a likely subject for
ROR.
In order to make the transient college student a more likely sub-
ject for ROR the university may assist by creating particular community
ties. Such community ties include allowing the student presently en-
rolled at the university to (1) consent in writing to have his academic
and disciplinary records checked to ascertain his commitment to the
university2 s and (2) separately consent in writing to have all of his
academic records and degree withheld until that student appears at
trial.29 The consent to the holding of records will provide the student
with three points on the evaluation form toward the minimum required
five points, which is necessary before ROR will be considered to be
recommended for the accused.
(Continued from preceding page)
exists in providing the judge with the defendant's past record where the defendant
has committed only a misdemeanor and will later be tried by the judge. Ares, et al.,
90-91.
26 A public record is a written memorial made by a public officer authorized by law
to make it. It is required by law to be kept, or necessary to be kept in discharge of
a duty imposed by law or directed by law to serve as a memorial and evidence of
something written, said, or done. Amos, Comptroller v. Gunn, 84 Fla. 285, 94 So. 615(1922). The mere fact that a record is on file in a public office, is made by a public
officer, or is in the custody of a public officer does not make it a public record. Miller
v. Murphy, 78 Cal. App. 751, 248 P. 934 (1926).
27 See n. 18 supra.
28 Below is an example of a form for the student-accused's consent to have his aca-
demic and disciplinary records checked:
(Continued on next page)
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The office of every college dean and the student activities offices
will be informed of the necessity for the judiciary to have access to
verified information on the student-accused.
The interviewer, upon being given the written consent of the stu-
dent-accused, will present the written consent card to the office worker
in any of the above appropriate offices. The office worker will have a
particular form which the office worker will fill out based on the infor-
mation in the student's files. The total points from this office form will
then be computed by the office worker who will give the total to the
interviewer and deposit the calculation form in the student's academic
file. The interviewer will then record this total on the student-accused's
consent card. The interviewer will never have actual knowledge of the
facts on the accused's academic or disciplinary record. The interviewer
will then total these points with any other points. The above pro-
cedure is in accord with both the legal guidelines and the words and
spirit of most university policies on the confidentiality of student files.30
(Continued from preceding page)
RECORD CHECK
UNIVERSITY STUDENT CONSENT Date
AND WAIVER FORM* No.
Name of Student
Last First Middle
SOLELY FOR THE PURPOSE OF VERIFYING THE FACTS WHICH I HAVE
PROVIDED THE DATA VERIFIER, I KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY
WAIVE MY RIGHT TO THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF MY UNIVERSITY
ACADEMIC AND DISCIPLINARY RECORDS AND I KNOWINGLY AND
VOLUNTARILY CONSENT TO HAVE MY UNIVERSITY ACADEMIC AND
DISCIPLINARY RECORDS CHECKED BY THE BAIL PROJECT.
*To be filled out in duplicate.
Signature of Student---------------------------
29 Below is an example of a form for the student-accused's consent to have his
records and degree withheld:
Date------------------
RECORD AND DEGREE HOLD FORM* No.-------------------
Name of Student
Last First Middle
I AGREE TO HAVE MY UNIVERSITY ACADEMIC RECORDS AND DEGREE
HELD BY THE UNIVERSITY UNTIL DISPOSITION OF THIS CASE IF I AM
RELEASED ON MY OWN RECOGNIZANCE.
*To be filled out in duplicate.
Signature of Student
30 Although college records may technically be kept by persons who are not public
officers, they meet most of the tests of being public records. M. WARE, LAW OF Gum-
ANCE AND COUNSELING 41 (1964). However, the availability of public or quasi-public
records for inspection by various individuals will be controlled either by common-
law concepts or by statutes.
In the Matter of Thibadeau, No. 6849, decided by Ewald B. Nyquist, Acting Com-
missioner of Education, University of the State of New York, State Education Depart-
ment (Sept. 22, 1960), the common-law right of inspection of pupil personnel records
was extended to the student, or if the student was a minor, to his parent or guardian.
The commissioner's holding indicated that state statutes making some reports privi-
leged or confidential were not effective as to the student, his parents, or guardian,
but it prevents disclosure to third parties.
Although there has been little legislation in regard to educational records, the
Michigan, Oklahoma, and California statutes are typical of the few statutes which
have been passed: (Continued on next page)
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Where, after verification, the case is considered a good risk and the
judge releases the student-accused on his own recognizance, a copy of
the court's journal entry recording such release will be sent to an
appropriate university administrator, who will then process a hold
procedure form. 31 Copies of such hold form will be delivered to the
appropriate university offices to hold the student's personal and aca-
demic records including his transcript, and to the student to confirm
the hold on his records.
Upon the appearance of the student-accused at all proceedings up
to and including trial, a copy of the court's journal entry recording such
appearance (s) will be sent to the above mentioned university adminis-
trator, who will then process a release of hold restrictions form.32 Copies
(Continued from preceding page)
MICHIGAN SCHOOL CODE, § 600.2165 (1963).
• . . nor to produce such records or transcript thereof, except . . . with the con-
sent of the person so confiding or to whom such records relate, if such person is
21 years of age or over, or, if such person is a minor, with the consent of his or
her parent or legal guardian.
Oklahoma makes revelation of information about a child a misdemeanor (Okla.
Stat. 70-6-16 [1949]).
CAL. EDuc. COoE 10751 (West 1960).
No [person] . . . shall permit access to any written records concerning any par-
ticular pupil . . . to any person except under judicial process unless the person is
one of the following (a) Either a parent or guardian of such pupil, (b) a person
designated,-in writing by such pupil if he is an adult, or by either parent or
guardian of such pupil if he is a minor.
THE MODEL CODE FOR STUDENT RIGHTS, REsPoNsrBILITIES AND CONDUCT, STUDENT LAW
DIVISION OF THE A.B.A. 5 (1969) provided that, "[n]o information in any student file
may be released to anyone except with the prior written consent of the student....
[T]he conditions of access to each [academic and disciplinary record] should be set
forth in an explicit policy statement [of the university].. . . Information from dis-
ciplinary and counseling files should not be available to unauthorized persons on
campus, or to any person off campus without the express consent of the student in-
volved except under legal compulsion or in cases where the safety of persons or
property is involved." Joint Statement of Rights and Freedoms of Students, 54
A.A.U.P. BULL. 258, 259 (June, 1968); A Statement of Rights and Responsibilities of
College and University Students, 1 HUaMAN RIGHTS 140, 151-2 (1970). Academic Free-
dom and Civil Liberties of Students in Colleges and Universities, American Civil Lib-
erties Union (April, 1970) provided: "Access to student records should be confined
to authorized university personnel who require access in connection with the per-
formance of their duties. All persons having access to student records should be in-
structed that the information contained therein must be kept confidential, and should
be required to sign and date their adherence to this procedure .... Persons outside
the university should not have access to student academic records without the stu-
dent's written permission, or to any other records, except in response to a constitu-
tionally valid subpoena." See Strachan, Should Colleges Release Grades of College
Students to Draft Board?, 43 N.D. L. REv. 721 (1967).
In addition, it may be that students have rights of privacy declared by the Ninth
Amendment or found in the "penumbras" of other constitutional provisions (Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 [1965]) that the universities must respect.
31 The Initiation of HOLD form may contain the following provisions: "The Initia-
tion of Hold Procedures requested by the office listed below will cause your records
maintained in the Registrar's Office and in the Office of Student Affairs Records to
be placed in an inactive status until the Hold has been released. This will result in
the non-release of any information about your attendance, including the issuance of
transcripts.
"To release the Hold on your records you must satisfy the requirements estab-
lished by the office originating the Hold. The specific nature of these requirements
may be obtained by contacting the office originating the Hold."
52 The RELEASE of Hold Restrictions form may contain the following provisions:
"This notice is to certify that the student named below has satisfied the obligations
for which a Hold had been placed on his records in the Registrar's Office and in the
Office of Student Affairs Records.
"The issuance of this form indicates that the student is entitled to the privi-
leges associated with enrollment provided he is eligible in all other respects."
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of such release form will be delivered to the appropriate university of-
fices to release the student's personal and academic records, and to the
student to notify him that such records have been released from hold
status.
University-Student Relationship After ROR
The situation may occur where a student-accused, with full knowl-
edge of the subject matter of the consent form, signs such consent form
to have his records held, is released OR, and then does not appear for
trial, but later requests that his records be released.3 3 Of course, the
university must remain firm on its commitment to hold the records and
degree. The thrust of such a decision by the administration of the uni-
versity is that the consent agreement is effective to hold the student's
records unless and until either the student appears for all court pro-
ceedings up to and including trial, or a court order is obtained declaring
the agreement void, voidable, unenforceable in law, or subject to in-
junctive relief.
Assuming the student elects to bring a court action for the release of
his records, if he personally enters the state to bring such an action, the
state authorities would probably assert jurisdiction over the student,
arrest and try him for the original charge and the separate offense of
bail-skipping. Nevertheless, he might bring a civil court action in a
state court for the release of his records.
In addition, when the student is a citizen of a state other than the
locus of the university, he might file an action in federal court asserting
jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship. It is difficult to conceive
such a federal suit extending beyond the pleading stage because of the
rapidly burgeoning abstention doctrines whereby a federal court in a
diversity action may decline jurisdiction.3 4 However, assuming such a
federal action could extend beyond the pleading stage, where the
ground for recovery goes to the binding nature of a consent agreement,
state substantive law will control.35
33 If the student was a minor at the time of giving consent he may attempt to dis-
affirm his consent contract by mail or otherwise from outside the jurisdiction and
request the release of his records.
34 The diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, purports to speak in very broad terms.
If a suit is between citizens of different states, and the jurisdictional amount is satis-
fied, the district court has original jurisdiction. There are, however, limitations on
the breadth of the jurisdiction thus seemingly conferred. The rapidly burgeoning
abstention doctrines permit, and in some circumstance may require, a federal court
to decline jurisdiction, or to postpone its exercise, even though the requirements of
the diversity statute are satisfied. One such abstention doctrine is that a federal
court should refrain from exercising its jurisdiction in order to avoid needless con-
flict with the administration by a state of its own affairs. Stefanelli v. Minard, 342
U.S. 117 (1951); Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157. See C. WRcrr, HAND-
BOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL CoURrs, § 25 and § 52 (1970); FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b).
35 In Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) Mr. Justice Brandeis
summarily stated the rule: "Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution
or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State.
And whether the law of the State shall be declared by its Legislature in a statute or
by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal concern."
12https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol20/iss3/9
State Substantive Law
Sovereign immunity. The threshold problem to a suit brought under
state substantive law is that, in many states, as in Ohio, the constitution
recognizes that suits may be brought against the state only in such
courts and only in such manner as may be provided by statutes.86 The
common-law doctrine of sovereign immunity applies when the state is
sued in contract or in tort in its own courts 37 or in the federal courts.3s
If the university in question is a state-supported institution and the
suit is against the university or its officer, as representing the state
in action and liability where the state, though not a party to the record,
is the real party against which relief is sought and where a judgment
for the plaintiff, though nominally against the defendant as an in-
dividual, could operate to control the action of the state or subject it to
liability, such a suit is treated as a suit against the state.Y9
Despite the persistence of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in
many states, an analysis of the ramifications of the consent agreement
under state substantive law is provided in recognition of the shaky
foundation of the doctrine of sovereign immunity which is based on
the old common-law concept that assumes that the state will ever be
ready and willing to act justly toward its citizens in the absence of
statutes or the intervention of the courts. 40
Release contract. This agreement which is styled a "consent agree-
ment" is, in effect, a release contract 4 ' which releases the rights of the
36 Omo CONST., art. 1, § 16.
At least fourteen states have consented by statute to suit on their contracts:
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 37, § 439.8 (B) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1965); IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-3401
(Burns 1968); MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 258, § 1 (1956); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 600.2051 (1963);
MrsN. STAT. Arm. § 3.751 (Supp. 1965); MoNr. REV. CODE ANN. § 83.601 (1966); NED.
REV. STAT. § 24-324 (1964); N.H. REV. SrAT. ANN. § 491.8 (1955); N.Y. CT. CL. ACT § 9
(1963); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-12-02 (1960); ORE. REV. STAT. § 30.320 (1961); S.D. Code
§ 21-32-1 (1967); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.92.010 (Supp. 1965).
However, such statutes are narrowly construed. In Wolf v. Ohio State Univ.,
170 Ohio St. 49, 162 N.E. 2d 475 (1959) the court refused to find consent to suit even
though Omio REV. CODE § 3335.03 (1953) provided that the Board of Trustees of The
Ohio State University was empowered to "sue and be sued." The court reasoned
that since this section did not provide in what courts and in what manner suit could
be brought against the Board, it was not the intention of the legislature to consent
to suits being brought.
3T Raudabaugh v. State of Ohio, 96 Ohio St. 513, 118 N.E. 102, error dismissed, 248
U.S. 32 (1918).
38 Palmer v. State, 248 U.S. 32 (1918).
39 State ex rel. Williams v. Glander, 148 Ohio St. 188, 74 N.E.2d 82 (1947), cert. de-
nied, 332 U.S. 817, 68 S. Ct. 157 (1947); Onto CONST., art. 7.
40 State ex rel. Parrott v. Board of Pub. Works, 36 Ohio St. 409 (1881).
41 A release contract is a writing which is supported by a sufficient consideration
and purports to be an immediate termination of the maker's contractual rights.
RE STATEmENT OF CoirniAcTs § 402.
To constitute a valid contract there must be the following: 1) a meeting of the
minds of the parties, 2) a legally sufficient consideration, 3) parties capable of con-
tracting, and 4) a lawful subject matter.
The meeting of the minds, that is, assent, is usually expressed by an offer and
an acceptance. Jacob v. Canine, 7 Ohio App. 268 (1917). The student-accused's ex-
ecution of the particular form and thereby making a consent promise to have his
records held is an offer to the university, which offer is accepted by the university's
act of holding the records; a unilateral contract is thereby formed.
Legally sufficient consideration consists of a legal detriment to the promisee or
a legal benefit to the promisor. Nott v. Johnson, 7 Ohio St. 270 (1857). The univer-
sity will have provided legally sufficient consideration for the promise of the student
(Continued on next page)
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student to evidence of attending college if he does not appear for all
proceedings up to and including trial.4
2
Since the parent (the father, and under certain circumstances the
mother) of the infant is entitled to the services of his child, 43 the right
of the parent to sue and recover based on infringement of that right
will, of course, depend upon the existence of tortious conduct on the
part of the defendant-university; that is, there must first be a tort for
which an action might be maintained by the child before the parent's
right obtains.
Because this right of the parent is entirely distinct from that which
may be maintained on behalf of the child, generally speaking, the par-
ent must engage in a separate release agreement in order for there to
be a bar to an effective suit by the parent for the loss of services of the
child.
However, because of the old rationale that a separate action by the
parent for the loss of services of the child due to wrongful exclusion
from school cannot be maintained by the parent on the theory that the
child alone is damaged,4 4 it is doubtful that a parent may maintain an
action for loss of services of the child due to the university's holding of
the student's records and diploma.
Duress, coercion, or undue influence. In relation to the "consent
agreement," the student might assert that it was obtained by duress,
coercion, or undue influence.
Although the words "duress" and "coercion" are not synonymous,
their meanings often shade one another 45 to the extent that the defi-
(Continued from preceding page)
since the act of holding the student's records is both 1) a legal detriment to the
university-promisee in that the university was not previously under a legal obliga-
tion to hold the student's records under these circumstances, and 2) a legal benefit
to the student-accused-promisor in that the student had no prior legal right to have
the university hold his records under these circumstances. The student-accused will
have provided legally sufficient consideration for the university's act of holding his
records since the student-accused's consent promise to have his records held is
a legal detriment to the student-accused-actee in that the student was not pre-
viously under a legal obligation to consent to have his records held under these cir-
cumstances.
In order for the parties to have the capacity to contract, they must have the
ability to understand or agree. Hosler v. Beard, 54 Ohio St. 398, 43 N.E. 1040 (1896).
Therefore, so long as the student has the ability to understand the nature of the
attempted agreement he has the capacity to contract. Likewise, the university,
through one of its authorized agents, has the capacity to contract. The university
would have authority to enter into such a contract as a fulfillment of its educational
purpose, which includes, where practical, expediting the student's return to his aca-
demic pursuits so long as he is neither a danger to himself, the academic community,
or the public in general.
There are no statutes or recognized public policies that militate against the law-
ful nature of the subject matter of the attempted contract. See Hendrickson Ma-
chine Co. v. Schumacher Co., 7 Ohio L. Abs. 732 (1929).
42 A release may be subject to the happening of a condition precedent. Stowe v.
United States Exp. Co., 179 Mich. 349, 146 N.W. 158 (1914).
43 See OHIO REV. CODE § 2111.08 (1953).
44 Boyd v. Blaisdell, 15 Ind. 73 (1860). Cf. Sorrells v. Matthews, 129 Ga. 319, 58 S.E.
819 (1907); Donahoe v. Richards, 38 Me. 376 (1854). Contra, Roe v. Deming, 21 Ohio
St. 666 (1871).
45 "'Duress' generally carries the idea of compulsion, either by means of actual
physical force or threatened physical force applied to the person to be influenced ...
or reputation of such person. 'Coercion' may include a compulsion brought about by
moral force or in some other manner with or without physical force." McKenzie-
Hnavie Co. v. Carbide. etc.. Corn.. 7S F. 2d 78 (8th Cir. 1934).
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nition of duress in courts of law has been enlarged "to regard any
transaction as voidable which the party seeking to avoid was not bound
to enter into and which was coerced by fear of a wrongful act by the
other party to the transaction." 46 Furthermore, even though the state-
ment is not strictly accurate, it has been said, "duress is but the ex-
treme of undue influence," 4 7 and, therefore, duress, coercion, and un-
due influence may be analyzed together as to certain of their mutual
elements. In regard to the mutual element of pressure (for duress, co-
ercion, and undue influence), the sole pressure that can effectively be
asserted to have been in existence is that which normally and neces-
sarily flows from incarceration,48 and not from conversation by an agent
for the university or merely from that agent's presence. In addition,
the requisite pressure does not exist since the student "really has a
choice"'49 among: 1) signing the consent agreement so that the uni-
versity may be of assistance to the student in that he may more readily
be considered for ROR, 2) hoping to be released OR based on his
community ties independent of those ties which would be formed by the
university acting on the execution of the consent agreement, 3) post-
ing bond, or 4) remaining incarcerated. As to the mutual element of a
wrongful act (for duress and coercion), where an agreement, such as
this consent agreement, is formed pursuant to a state ROR statute and/or
under the authorization of the local bar association it can hardly be
argued to be wrongful.
50
Minority. Another assertion of the student in a court action might
be that, due to his minority the consent agreement may be avoided.
However, the minor's attempted disaffirmance should not succeed; that
is, although the general rule of the jurisdiction may be that infants' con-
46 WnLISTON ON CON'rACTS, Rev. Ed. § 1603.
47 Commercial Nat'l. Bank v. Wheelock, 52 Ohio St. 534, 40 N.E. 636 (1895).
Where by virtue of the relation between them it is justified in assuming that
the other party will not act in a manner inconsistent with his welfare, a transaction
induced by unfair persuasion of the latter, is induced by undue influence and is
voidable, as it deprives the other of his free agency. Peck v. Williams, 82 Ohio App.
35, 79 N.E. 2d 562 (1948).
In the absence of a relationship between the parties to a transaction which tends
to give one dominance over the other, undue influence must generally be proved by
the party setting it up and will not be presumed. Purdy v. Watts, 88 Conn. 214, 90
A. 936 (1914). When such a relationship of dominance of one party exists, however,
as is ordinarily the case where there is a fiduciary or confidential relation between
the parties it raises a presumption of undue influence and throws upon the dominant
party the burden of establishing the fairness of the transaction and that it was the
free act of the other party. Brown v. Canadian Indus. Alcohol Co., 209 Cal. 596, 289
P. 613 (1930).
48 It is neither duress nor undue influence when a party is constrained to enter into
a transaction by force of circumstances for which the other party is not responsible.
Silliman v. United States, 101 U.S. 465 (1879).
49 Joannin v. Ogilvie, 49 Minn. 564, 568, 52 N.W. 217 (1892).
50 The pressure must be wrongful. Connolly v. Bouck, 174 F. 312 (8th Cir. 1909). In
order that a transaction may be avoided on account of duress or undue influence, it
must appear that the consent of the student seeking to avoid the transaction was co-
erced; that is, that he was actually induced by the duress or undue influence to give
his consent, and would not have done so otherwise. Towson v. Moore, 173 U.S. 17
(1899).
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tracts are voidable, the public policy underpinnings of such a rule
should disallow disaffirmance.5'
The policy reason for allowing disaffirmance is that the welfare of
an infant is the law's first consideration, and it is the settled policy
of the law to protect the infant against liability on his contracts, whether
provident or improvident, on the theory that his mind and judgment are
immature and that he needs to be sheltered from his own imprudent
folly.5 2 There is a serious question whether the above policy reason
should apply when a college-age student knowingly consents to a con-
tract that is of vital interest to his well-being. 3
University regulations. Regardless of the peculiar facts that may
surround the independent consent agreement, in many states where a
student matriculates at a college or university, a contractual relation-
ship is established under which, upon compliance with all the require-
ments for graduation, he is entitled to a degree or diploma. When a stu-
dent is admitted to a private university he impliedly promises to sub-
mit to and be governed by all the necessary and proper rules and regu-
lations which have been or may be adopted for the governance of the
institution.54
Although state-supported universities often assert the contractual
relationship as a basis of the student-university relationship, such pub-
lic institutions also have the delegated power of the state which allows
the university authorities to make all necessary and proper rules and
regulations for the orderly management of the institution.
55
51 Cassella v. Tiberio, 150 Ohio St. 27, 80 N.E. 2d 426 (1948).
An infant may avoid a contract through a legal representative. Crockett Motor
Co. v. Thompson, 177 Ark. 495, 6 S.W. 2d 834 (1928). However, since an infant can-
not personally prosecute an action in court, an action on his behalf must be brought
by a guardian ad litem. Irby v. Dowdy, 139 Ark. 299, 213 S.W. 739 (1919).
52 Mestetzko v. Elf Motor Co., 119 Ohio St. 575, 165 N.E. 93 (1929).
53 For example, where there is an obligation that is imposed by law, it is an excep-
tion to avoidance of contracts by infants. Such an obligation is imposed by OHio
REv. CODE § 2937.38 which states that, in any matter in which a minor is admitted to
bail, the minority of the accused shall not be available as a defense to a judgment
against the principal or surety. The statute is not precisely in point; however, it is
a close enough analogy to reveal a public policy behind the denial of the ability to
disaffirm such a consent contract.
In addition, the following statement is a cogent reason for disallowing disaffirm-
ance: "Such non-monetary conditions as constitutionally may be imposed should be
employed to assure the defendant's appearance at court and to prevent the commis-
sion of criminal violations while the defendant is at liberty pending adjudication."
STANDARDS RELATING TO PRETRIAL RELEASE 25-26.
54 Carr v. St. John's Univ., 235 N.Y.S. 834, 187 N.E. 2d 18 (1962); Sutton v. Western
Reserve Univ., 12 O.L.R. 539 (1914).
In a case where an expelled student was refused a transcript of completed cred-
its furnished to her, the court said that the action, based partly on contract and part-
ly on duty from long recognized and established customs and usage, was within the
province of equity and the court could grant relief. Strank v. Mercy Hosp., 383 Pa.
54, 117 A. 2d 697 (1955). However, the courts have held that the burden of establish-
ing a breach of contract lies upon the student. Anthony v. Syracuse Univ., 224 App.
Div. 487, 231 N.Y.S. 435 (1928). In addition, the courts have permitted the institution
to negate any implied rights of the student by an express statement in the publica-
tion. Robinson v. Univ. of Miami, 100 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1958).
55 Pyeatte v. Board of Regents, 102 F. Supp. 407 (W.D. Okla.), aff'd without op., 342
U.S. 936 (1952). The Pyeatte case at 415, provided that regulations of the board of re-
(Continued on next page)
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The courts have generally employed the law of contracts to adjust
student-school relations by enforcing the contractual terms which many
universities have incorporated into their publications.
56
Where the student has been found to be duly qualified under the
university-student contract, and the issuance of a diploma depends
upon ministerial acts, the performance of which are arbitrarily re-
fused, it seems that mandamus will lie, even though the issuance
of the diploma is not required by statute.5 7 Therefore, it would ap-
pear that where the student has, upon matriculation, contracted with
his institution to the effect that the university need not grant a degree
or diploma unless all the necessary and proper rules, including the
separate ROR consent contract, are met, the granting of a degree or
diploma where such ROR consent contract existed and the student
did not appear for trial, would not be a ministerial act subject to man-
damus.
Thus, if an explicit explanation of the nature and results of the
consent form is included in the student handbook, the consent contract
to hold all records may be binding 5 even against attempted avoidance
and will not subject the university administrator to a mandamus action.
(Continued from preceding page)
gents of a state university requiring students to live in dormitories, or fraternity or
sorority houses, with some exceptions, are not unreasonable or arbitrary and do not
violate the Fourteenth Amendment with respect to a private boarding house operator
who had formerly been permitted to board students.
56 John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 102 So. 637 (1924); Samson v. Trustees
of Columbia Univ., 167 N.Y.S. 202, af'd mem., 181 App. Div. 936, 167 N.Y.S. 1125
(1917); Goldberg v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 871 n. 2, 57 Cal.
Rptr. 463, 466 n. 2 (1967). Prior to the beginning of classes the new student receives
a handbook or catalogue for his reference, guidance and orientation. Symposium-
Uncertainty in College Disciplinary Regulations, 29 OHo ST. L. J. 1023 (1968).
57 Such would be the case where the relator has complied with all the requirements
and regulations entitling him to a diploma, and is unreasonably deprived thereof.
Valentine v. Independent School Dist., 187 Iowa 555, 174 N.W. 334 (1919). See also
State ex rel. Watkins v. Donahey, 110 Ohio St. 494, 144 N.E. 125 (1924).
58 Contra, Since the terms of the contract are dictated, the law of contracts of adhe-
sion would provide the proper standard for interpretation. Accordingly, the burden
of clarity as well as the burden of proof would be on the institution. As long as
the institution prescribes the terms of the agreement, any ambiguity should be con-
strued in favor of the student, just as any confusion in an insurance policy is re-
solved in favor of the insured or his beneficiary. Cf. Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion
-Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 633 (1943).
In some circumstances a court might refuse to enforce certain "consent waiver"
clauses on the ground that they are unconscionable or against public policy. Just as
automobile warranty disclaimers have been held void in view of the importance of
and need for the defense of the consumer, provisions of this kind might be denied
effect because of the interest in and occasion for the protection of the student. At
times, for geographical, financial, or other reasons a student seeking a college educa-
tion may have no choice but to enroll at a university which includes a "waiver"
clause among its regulations. In any case, he will almost certainly have insufficient
bargaining power to obtain any other terms than those the school chooses to dictate.
See Developments in the Law-Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1045, 1145-1147
(1968).
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions limits the restrictions a university
can place on a student's exercise of constitutionally guaranteed rights. It states that
the enjoyment of a benefit or privilege provided by the government may not be con-
ditioned upon the waiver or relinquishment of a constitutional right except where
justified by an overriding societal interest. Applied to the educational context this
means that once a state establishes a university, it may not condition attendance on
the abandonment of constitutionally protected rights. Keyishian v. Board of Regents,
385 U.S. 589 (1967). Therefore, it can be argued that the constitutionally protected
(Continued on next page)
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Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause
Since a college education is no longer regarded as a luxury for the
fortunate few, but rather a necessity for the multitudes, the conse-
quences for a particular student of the deprivation of evidence of at-
tending college may be more grave than those involved in some crimi-
nal court proceedings. 59 Furthermore, today, a tax-supported institu-
tion of higher education is considered a state governmental body; there-
fore, when a tax-supported university acts to the detriment of a student,
that act may be such an injury that the "Constitution requires the act
to be consonant with due process of law." 69 That is, students are now
declared to be " 'persons' under [our] Constitution . . . possessed of
fundamental rights which the State must respect, just as they them-
selves must respect their obligations to the State." 61 Therefore, the
deprivation of attending college, especially by a state institution,6 2 may
raise serious state and federal constitutional questions.
Jurisdiction. To determine whether a person can gain relief in fed-
eral court for the alleged deprivation of his civil rights one must look
to the question of whether the Congress has provided the federal courts
with jurisdiction to hear such cases. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 (Civil Rights
(Continued from preceding page)
interest in attending a state-supported university [see note 70 infral cannot be con-
ditioned upon a waiver of an equally important interest in access to evidence of such
attendance in the form of his records and/or diploma, where the waiver supposedly
comes into being merely by the student being admitted to the university, since the
university administration has included a provision for a student to choose to have
his records and diploma held to assist the student in receiving ROR. However, such
an argument does not bear scrutiny. The only "contract" or regulation created in
this regard, if any, is that if the student at some later time freely chooses to have
his records and diploma held to assist him in receiving ROR the university will hold
the records and diploma as the student and the university separately agree between
themselves. Thus, it can hardly be said that there is an attempted waiver of a con-
stitutional interest at the time of admission to the university.
59 Soglin v. Kauffman, 295 F. Supp. 978, 988 (W.D. Wis. 1968).
60 Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F. 2d 150, 155 (5th Cir. 1961) (Rives, J.,
majority opinion). "This opinion by judge Rives had the force of an idea whose time
had come and it has swept the field." Wright, The Constitution on the Campus, 22
VAND. L. REV. 1027, 1032 (1969).
61 Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511
(1969).
62 Thus far the "state action" doctrine has not been sufficiently developed to subject
"private" colleges to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. There-
fore, the private college cases are not determinative of the procedures required by
a tax-supported institution, and the converse.
Otherwise "private" institutions have been found to be involved in sufficient
"state action" to make them susceptible to the Fourteenth Amendment where there
was any one or a combination of the following: 1) state control, either financial,
constitutional or legislative, 2) public function, or 3) state contacts. "Application of
the doctrine has been limited to private institutions with a policy of racial discrimi-
nation. The courts have seemingly been reluctant to extend the doctrine to eliminate
other kinds of activities that would be deemed unconstitutional if performed solely
by the state. Two cases decided during [1968] serve to exemplify this reluctance."
Grossner v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 287 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) and Powe
v. Miles, 407 F. 2d 73 (2nd Cir. 1968). Accord, Greene v. Howard University, 412 F.
2d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1969). See Comment, Student Due Process in the Private Univer-
sity: The State Action Doctrine, 20 SYRAcusE L. REv. 911, 914-19 (1969); Comment,
Judicial Intervention in Expulsions or Suspensions by Private Universities, 5 Wmr AM-
ErE L. J. 277 (1969). Contra, the presence of government has so far penetrated, that
few colleges are today wholly "private" in the sense of being altogether immune to
the Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights. Van Alstyne, The Judicial Trend
Toward Student Academic Freedom, 20 FLA. L. Rsv. 290, 291 (1968).
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Act of 1871) is the usual basis for a federal suit for declaratory and in-
junctive relief against the president and board of trustees of a state-
supported university where it is alleged that, acting under color of law,
they deprived the student of rights secured to him by the Constitution
of the United States. 2
The federal remedy (42 U.S.C.A. § 1983) is supplementary to the
state remedy, and the latter need not first be sought and refused before
the federal one is invoked.6 4
Sovereign immunity. The common-law doctrine of sovereign im-
munity has been held to apply in a suit brought under the Federal Civil
Rights Act. Such was the case in Corbean v. Xenia City Board of Edu-
cation,6" where, after a suit in the Ohio state courts against the school
district for tort was dismissed because of sovereign immunity, an ac-
tion was commenced in the federal district court. Federal jurisdiction
was asserted by labeling the action one to redress deprivation of civil
rights under 28 U.S.C. 1343 (3). The United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court stating: "The de-
cisions of the Ohio Courts in this litigation reaffirmed adherence to the
doctrine of sovereign immunity, and found it applicable here. We follow
Ohio law in this tort action unless such Ohio law offends federal law or
the United States Constitution. [citations omitted.] We have held that
Ohio's doctrine of sovereign immunity has not been abrogated by the
Civil Rights Acts." 66 (Emphasis added.)
In the Corbean case, a tort action was initiated in the state court.
This cause was subsequently brought to the federal district court for
the sole reason that sovereign immunity barred the action in the state
court. However, in Roth v. The Board of Regents of State Colleges6 7
an action was initiated in the federal court alleging the deprivation of a
positive constitutional right. The Roth court stated, in reference to the
common-law doctrine of sovereign immunity, the reasons for the doc-
trine "do not support extending, nor have courts extended, the doc-
trine to shield officials from the type of equitable relief here requested." 68
In addition, the Roth case made it clear that neither the Eleventh
Amendment nor the doctrine of Hans v. Louisiana serves as a shield of
sovereign immunity in an action for declaratory and injunctive relief
in accordance with 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983.69
Substantive due process. Assuming there is jurisdiction and no
similar bar to a suit, substantive due process will not provide relief.
This is, in part, because, although the interest, whether a privilege or a
63 Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
64 Lucia v. Duggan, 303 F. Supp. 112, 117 (D. Mass. 1969) citing Monroe v. Pape, 365
U.S. 167, 183, 81 S. Ct. 473 (1961).
65 366 F. 2d 480 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1041 (1967).
86 Id., 481.
67 310 F. Supp. 972 (W.D. Wis. 1970).
68 Id., 975.
69 Id., 974-975.
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right, to attend college, is vital,7 0 it is not a "fundamental personal free-
dom [race, religion, speech, association, self-incrimination, etc.] calling
for application of the rule 'where there is a significant encroachment
upon personal liberty, the State may prevail only upon showing a sub-
ordinating interest which is compelling.' "71 But whatever the scope
and derivation, it is such an interest that it may not be taken away
under arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable standards; that is, although it
is not a positive constitutional right, it does receive general due process
protection.
7 2
Procedural due process. Likewise, such an interest may not be di-
vested in an arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable fashion in regard to
the procedure used.
7 3
Under the proposed ROR program, since both the standards and
procedure for holding the student's records and diploma are rational
and fair and clearly consented to, it will be upheld against an attack
based on deprivation of general due process.
Conclusion
A ROR bail program which reasonably assures the appearance of
the accused at trial, but allows him pretrial freedom without substan-
tial financial loss is desirable, workable, and often necessary for the
college-oriented communities.7 4 With the establishment of such a pro-
gram, the arrested transient college student is simply provided limited
community ties similar to those he would have in his home town.
7 Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F. 2d 150, 156 (5th Cir. 1961).
71 Lucia v. Duggan, 303 F. Supp. 112, 117 (D. Mass. 1969).
72 Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 894-
899 (1961).
73 The following cases deal with student discipline. However, the general principle
regarding fairness may be analogous: "The only requirement necessary, so far as
concerns a review of the matter in a court of justice, is that it shall not be so un-
reasonable and oppressive as to leave the conclusion of unfairness on the part of the
teachers." Koblitz v. Western Reserve Univ., 11 O.C.D. 515, 524 (Cuyahoga Cir.
1901). Although (since Western Reserve University was a private school) there were
no due process determinations, the Koblitz case still went off on the doctrine of rea-
sonableness and fairness.
The case of Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), made it clear that 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1958) was to have a broad application, which indicated that it could now also
be used as a basis of relief by a state university student alleging a denial of due
process. Based on such statutory construction, the cases of Jones v. State Bd. of
Educ. of and for the State of Tennessee, 279 F. Supp. 190 (M.D. Tenn. 1968), af'd,
407 F. 2d 834 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 31 (1970) and Norton v. The
Discipline Comm. of East Tennessee State Univ., 419 F. 2d 195 (6th Cir. 1969) stated
that the procedures afforded the students were both fair and reasonable and there-
fore did not deprive them of their due process rights.
74 Such a program may be a minimum necessity in reducing the schisms between
and among the student, university administration, and non-university community
subcultures, assuming such divisiveness to be caused, at least in part, by the du-
plicity of the theory of justice in the American legal system and its application, as
perceived by the respective parties.
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